The communication procedures of international human rights tribunals in a few cases have served as catalysts for amicable settlement of disputes and self-initiated redress of human rights violations. International litigation has the potential of exposing states to undesirable negative publicity which could affect their standing before their donors and in the comity of nations. In a bid to avoid the "naming and shaming" and negative publicity associated with having to defend a potentially scandalous human rights violations case, states in Africa have found it desirable, in some cases, to submit to a private confidential process of amicable settlement or to quickly undertake proactive measures to redress the violations before a decision is made on the merits by the relevant human rights tribunal. This article examines notable examples of amicable settlement of disputes in the African human rights system and the inherent potentials and pitfalls in the use of such mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa. While focusing on the three main regional human rights tribunals in Africa, the article argues the need for the overhauling of the rules of procedures of the three human rights bodies examined, which are largely underdeveloped with regard to the specific requirements and conditions for arriving at a friendly settlement. The article also highlights the importance of funding and professionalism to the proper handling of the friendly settlement procedure and discusses other factors responsible for the underutilization of the friendly settlement procedure by regional human rights tribunals in Africa.
Introduction
The amicable settlement procedure is an important mechanism for the resolution of human rights disputes. Peaceful resolution of conflicts is a general principle of law recognized under the United Nations Charter (Tinoco, 2005; Reisman & Benesch 2003) . 1 This method of dispute resolution is common in traditional Africa where peaceful co-existence after legal tussles is a cherished cultural value. Surprisingly, the three main regional human rights tribunals in Africa, namely the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission), African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Court) and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children's Rights Committee), have resorted to the friendly settlement procedure in relatively few cases (Viljoen, 2012; Contesse, 2019) . This situation is particularly worrisome for the African Commission which is supposed to be a shining example of amicable settlement on the continent. Unlike in Africa, the friendly settlement procedure has been effective in the European and Inter-American human rights systems (Standaert, 1999; Kuveya, 2006; Ziccardi et al., 2018) . Settled cases in the European human rights system, for instance, have covered applications alleging violations of every one of the thirteen guaranteed freedoms under the European Convention on Human Rights (Weber, 2007) . Before undertaking a review of the specific cases of amicable settlement by the three main human rights tribunals in Africa, it is appropriate to provide an introductory exposition, for the sake of terminological clarity, of what is referred to as "friendly settlement". The friendly settlement procedure, also referred to as the amicable settlement procedure, may be defined as a voluntary, confidential, non-contentious and quasi-judicial procedure with a view to achieving peaceful and amicable resolution of disputes (Kuveya, 2006) . Traditionally, the mechanism has been referred to as "good offices" (Ramcharan, 1982) . Some of the widely used approaches of amicable settlement include negotiation, which by far is the simplest and most commonly used method of friendly settlement that entails primarily discussions between the disputing parties with a view to reconciling their divergent views and finding common grounds (Shaw, 2005) . Another method of friendly settlement is good offices and mediation. Under this method, a third party, usually a member or members of a human rights tribunal (HRT), encourages the disputants to come to a settlement (Ramcharan, 1982) . Other methods of friendly settlement include inquiry and conciliation (Shaw, 2005) .
The benefits of the amicable settlement procedure are many. It is a win-win procedure that benefits not only the state but also the victim and even the HRT. Importantly, it helps in reducing the court's caseload and reduces animosity among parties whose matters have been settled by the tribunal. Amicable settlement of both inter-state and individual communications saves a great deal of time and productive man-hour, since the procedure is expeditious and thus not likely to waste the time of the parties. Rather than going through the process of trial defending an indefensible human rights violation suit at a great expense to the state, it saves money to open a channel of communication with the alleged victim. The process of obtaining evidence, preparing evidence, presenting witnesses, and defending the case may be time consuming and challenging for both parties. Amicable settlement also protects the privacy of the parties involved as the procedure is convenient and confidential thus, saving the state the embarrassment of a public trial. In order words, it affords the state an opportunity to clean up its acts quietly (Murray, 2000) . It also helps to find a common ground or meeting point between the parties. As such, no one is left out of the loop and no one feels entirely unsatisfied with the process.
The procedure may, however, be criticized for the imbalance of powers created by the nature of the dispute and the identity of the parties (Standaert, 1999) . Most times, third parties such as civil society organizations are excluded from the process of friendly settlement between the representatives of the victims and the state. There is also the concern that government may be "paying off" victims or "buying" their way out of a finding of violation. The friendly settlement procedure generally may prevent the growth of legal jurisprudence, thus reducing the full impact of litigation. For instance, a public interest litigation is usually instituted not only because of the immediate interests of the parties concerned but for all potential litigants at present and in the nearest future. The value of the legal jurisprudence that comes from judgments of judicial bodies cannot therefore, be understated. The bottom-line is that not every kind of case may be resolved through the friendly settlement procedure. There are situations the procedure may be inappropriate and detrimental to the interests of the parties (Standaert, 1999 ). Yet another shortcoming of the friendly settlement procedure is that it does not imply an acknowledgment of wrongdoing by government unless the wrongdoing is expressly acknowledged in the settlement agreement. From a broader societal point of view, the friendly settlement procedure may undermine the society's right to know the truth. While friendly settlement is by far not a perfect procedure, it provides a sense of self-empowerment to parties and moves away from the notion that blindly complying with the purist ideas of punishment is the only way to serve the interest of victims of human rights violations. Despite its shortcomings, the amicable settlement procedure has gained popularity in the European and the Inter-American human rights systems mainly (Keller et al., 2010) .
Under the European human rights system, articles 38 and 39 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (European Convention) regulate the use of the friendly settlement procedure. Once a case has been declared admissible, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is required to place itself at the disposal of the parties for a friendly resolution of the dispute on the basis of respect for human rights. procedure is an important tool for the reduction of the caseload of the ECtHR, and it is increasingly resorted to by both the victims of human rights violations and states (Keller et al., 2010) . The friendly settlement procedure is envisaged in articles 48 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and article 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACmHR). While the European regional system tends to favour the conciliatory approach it its friendly settlement procedure, the Inter-American regional human rights system uses both mediation and conciliation (Dijk et al., 2018) . Between 1985 and 2018, the Inter-American human rights system has facilitated over 174. 3 In recent years, the Commission signs anaverage of between five and eight settlements per year (Contesse, 2019) .
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Despite the universal existence and acceptance of the friendly settlement, the procedure has not been used frequently by regional human rights tribunals in Africa (Kuveya, 2006; Viljoen, 2012) . A basic question therefore is why has this procedure not been used widely in the Africa human rights system? Below, the article reviews the jurisprudence of the three main human rights bodies in Africa with a view to identifying cases they have resolved through amicable settlement and the peculiarities of each of the human rights bodies in relation to the friendly settlement procedure. The article concludes by pointing out areas in need of reforms in the jurisprudence and rules of procedures of the three main human rights tribunals in Africa and what may be done to make the friendly settlement procedure an effective case management tool and mechanism for quick dispensation of human rights complaints in Africa.
The African Human Rights System
The African human rights system is generally regarded as the least developed of all the three main regional systems of human rights in the world (Steiner & Alston, 2000; Gittleman, 1982) . Although African leaders came together in 1963 to form the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), the earliest attempt at creating a common human rights standard for the African continent, similar to the European and Inter-American human rights system, dates back to 1961, during the first ever Congress of African Jurists held in Lagos (Viljoen, 2012; Ayeni, 2011 continent (Ayeni, 2018) . 5 The Charter contains 29 substantive provisions covering the three general of human rights, namely civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights and what has been regarded as solidarity rights (Viljoen, 2012) . The Charter contains four distinctive features. Firstly, it treats all the three generations of rights as indivisible, inseparable and justiceable (Udombana, 2004; Viljoen, 2012) . 6 Second, the Charter introduces a novel concept, peoples' rights, and it has been praised as the first legally binding instrument to provide for peoples' rights (Kiwanuka, 1988 See generally the preamble of the African Charter which states that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights. means that only individuals and NGOs from these states may bring a case directly before the Court (Ayeni, 2018) .
The third primary human rights body on the African continent is the African Committee of Experts on the rights and welfare of the Child (African Children's Rights Committee), established through the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child adopted by African leaders on 11 July 1990 (Ayeni, 2018) .
13
African Children's Rights Committee comprises 11 members and it is mandated to receive individual communications in addition to interpreting provisions of the African Children's Charter and examining periodic reports from states.
14 In summary, all the three main human rights bodies, the African Commission, African Court and the African Children's Committee have a mandate to receive and determine inter-state and individual communications arising from any disputes referred to them. However, the focus of this article is not the individual communication procedure of the various human rights tribunals in Africa as such but the competence of the tribunals to undertake amicable settlement of disputes referred to them, and the usefulness of such procedure for human rights protection in Africa.
African Commission
Being a quasi-judicial body, it is naturally expected that the African Commission would have a very strong mandate under the African Charter for undertaking amicable settlement of disputes referred to it (Viljoen, 2012) . However, this is not the case. It is only in relation to interstate communications that the Charter expressly mandates the Commission to 'reach amicable solution'. 15 The lack of 'individual friendly settlement procedure' in the African Charter, some scholars have argued, may be explained by the initial ambiguity surrounding the competence of the Commission to handle individual complaints (Viljoen, 2012) . Thankfully, the Rules of Procedure of the Commission now contains the procedure for amicable settlement of disputes by the Commission. 16 Whenever the Commission declares a communication admissible, it shall place its good offices at the disposal of the interested state parties. 17 The Commission, acting through its Bureau, is required to establish contact with the relevant authorities of the state concerned. The Commission afterwards may appoint a Rapporteur, convene a meeting or series of meetings with the parties and facilitate the drafting of a Memorandum of Understanding containing the terms of settlement. 18 The
Commission also has the responsibility, through its Rapporteur, to follow-up and monitor implementation of the terms of the agreement and report non-compliance to the relevant organs of the African Union (AU). October 1996 following amicable resolution of the issues raised in the communication. 20 The friendly resolution in this case was made possible by the change in government as the new government at the time was desirous of dissociating from the past injustices of the previous administration (Kuveya, 2006) Njawe and released equipment of the radio station that were confiscated. Government also committed itself to granting provisional authorization for the operation of the station. In the spirit of "give and take", the complainant also agreed to withdrawn the communication before the Commission. The Commission however requested the parties to submit to the Commission's Secretariat a copy of the amicable settlement between the parties.
The amicable settlement practices of the African Commission may be criticized for being too much defensive of the state, and showing little regard for human rights and the interests of the victims. In practice, the African Commission does not really initiate amicable settlement (Viljoen, 2012) . The Commission merely transmits "a reconciliatory state response to the complainants for 414 Beijing Law Review their acceptance". Thus, in some of the cases discussed above where the Commission claimed to have resolved amicably, the consents of the victims or their legal representatives were rarely obtained. It has been argued that the friendly settlement procedure "presupposes the absence of any decision on the merits of the case" (Ouguergouz, 2003) . It is therefore puzzling why the African Commission in some cases reviewed above offered its good offices to the peaceful resolution of the disputes even after a decision on the merits. 26 The amicable settlement procedure ought to be followed at any time before the issuance of a decision of the merits. It is also important for the Commission to ensure parties, especially the victims and complainants, agree to the terms of the settlement. 
African Court
The Protocol establishing the African Court states that the Court may "try to reach an amicable settlement in a case pending before it in accordance with the provisions of the Charter". 27 This provision may also imply that the friendly settlement jurisdiction of the Court is limited to cases between states since that is the tenor of article 48 of the African Charter (Viljoen, 2012) . However, the Rules of Procedures of the Court extends the friendly settlement procedures to individual communications. The Rules of Procedure of the African Court recognize two types of amicable settlement procedure. 28 In the first case, the parties reach an amicable settlement, out of court and independently of the Court's intervention. Usually, the Court has powers to either accept or reject this settlement.
Where it accepts the settlement, the Court issues a judgment setting out a brief statement of the facts of the case and the solutions proposed and accepted by the parties (Viljoen, 2012) . The solutions are incorporated into the judgment of the Court. In the second instance, the Court plays a very active role in the process of settlement. It is required under this procedure that both parties must consent to every component of the solutions proposed and the agreement reached must be "based on respect for human and peoples' rights". 29 If the terms of the agreement and the conditions under which they were arrived at are acceptable to the Court, it will then issue a judgment similar to the one above setting out a brief statement of the facts of the case as well as the solutions. It must be noted that negotiations between parties are treated as confidential and may not be relied upon in any subsequent proceedings of the Court. ally be in a better position to persuade a state to "soften its position" in anticipation of an "unfavorable judicial decision" (Viljoen, 2012) . It seems quasi-judicial human rights bodies in general have an advantage over judicial human rights bodies in the area of amicable settlement of disputes (Ebobrah, 2011) . In the In-
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African Court Protocol, article 9 (stating that the Court may try to reach an amicable settlement in a case pending before it in accordance with the provisions of the Charter). This provision derives also from article 52 of the African Charter which empowers the African Commission, whose protective mandate the Court complements, to 'try all appropriate means to reach an amicable solution based on the respect of human and peoples' rights'. This provision, however, relates only to inter-state communications. ter-American human rights system, for instance, friendly settlement of disputes has been championed by the relevant quasi-judicial body (Shelton, 1983) . In the spirit of positive complementarity, the Court ought to defer to the African commission and possibly the African Children's Rights Committee in respect of friendly settlement. While the African Court may continue from time to time to undertake some friendly settlement proceedings, the Court should focus primarily on its adjudicatory role; leaving the primary responsibility for amicable settlement of disputes within the African human rights system to the African Commission and the African Children's Rights Committee.
African Children's Rights Committee
The African Children's Rights Committee may on its own initiative promote amicable on the basis of the best interest of the child. 33 However, the process shall continue only on basis of mutual consent of the parties. Prior to consideration of the merits of a communication, the Committee may set a time for parties to express their for amicable settlement. 34 The process may be terminated on any of the following grounds: if the Committee finds that the dispute is not suitable for amicable resolution; if the any of the parties withdraws its consent to the process or the subject matter involves a serious or massive violation of children's rights. 35 Once a settlement has been reached, the Committee shall adopt a report setting out the facts, the issues and the terms of settlement reached. The report is transmitted to the parties for their endorsements and signatures, after with the Committee shall adopt the report and authorise its publication. 36 The terms of the settlement must be based on respect for human rights. Amicable settlement concluded outside the auspices of the Committee must be reported to the Committee. This is a very important development as it demonstrates the capacity of the amicable settlement procedure to induce constructive dialogue and engagement as well as voluntary compliance by states. In the meantime, it remains to be seen whether the African Children's Committee will continue to use the amicable settlement procedure or abandon it the way the African Commission has done.
Since the communication procedure of the Committee is relatively under-developed compared to the African Commission and the African Court, it is not out of place to give the Committee some more time to evolve its amicable settlement jurisprudence.
Proactive Remediation of Violations
Another practice which though falls short of the friendly settlement procedure but nonetheless useful and noteworthy is proactive remediation of violations.
Proactive remediation of violations, in the context of the complaint procedure of HRTs, is a process whereby states engage in "damage control" after complaints have been lodged with a relevant HRT. It may be borne out of a genuine concern for the victims or merely a "public relations stunt", depending on the nature of the state implementing the remediation. Unlike amicable settlement which is a mutual process that involves both parties to the case, with or without the supervision of the HRT, proactive remediation is mostly a one-sided process con- on their vessel was fuel oil, not crude oil. 47 The Nigerian government initially refused to immediately release the applicants; however, they were released soon after a complaint was submitted to the ECCJ. 48 In other words, the applicants were released prior to, but in anticipation of, the Court making the pronouncement to that effect. The proactive remediation approach is more and more being resorted to by states rather than engage in full-blown friendly settlement procedure where some wrongdoings will have to be admitted before an agreement is signed by the parties. The merit of this new approach is however open to criticism as states tend to cherry-pick what action is sufficient as proactive remedy of the violation. The consent of the victim is rarely sought and the human rights body is not invited to sign off on any action taken.
Conclusion
There is no question that the amicable settlement procedure helps international human rights tribunals to engage in constructive dialogues with states. If properly deployed, the procedure has the potential to reduce HRTs' work load and backlog of cases, and this is why the procedure has been critical to the overall success story of the European and the Inter-American human rights systems.
Despite its potentials, the friendly settlement procedure has hardly made any noticeable impact on how the three primary human rights tribunals in Africa There is no doubt that the friendly settlement procedure in the African human rights system is in need of reforms to make it more effective, victim-driven, result-oriented and based on respect for human rights. Funding is key to implementing an effective friendly settlement procedure. Without funding, the vari- to the settlement and the settlement is approved by the tribunal after it has been found to be based on respect for human rights.
